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Recent Developments

Hernandez v. State
When Requested by Counsel, Trial Court Must Ask Specific Voir Dire Questions
Regarding Potential Racial Bias
By AkiaFox

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that even in
the absence of evidence suggesting
potential bias, the trial court must ask
specific voir dire questions regarding
racial bias when requested to do so
by counsel. Hernandez v. State, 357
Md. 204, 742 A.2d 952 (1999). The
court opined that a trial court's refusal
to racially particularize a voir dire
question at the re'quest of counsel
constituted reversible error. In so
holding, the court of appeals
unequivocally stated that a showing of
"special circumstances" of the
likelihood of racial bias among the
jurors is not a prerequisite to receive
racially specific voir dire questions.
Petitioner, Jorge Hernandez
("Hernandez"), a Hispanic, was
convicted in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County of child abuse
and second-degree rape. At trial,
Hernandez testified in Spanish through
an interpreter. The state proved that
Hernandez had vaginal intercourse
with the nine year old Hispanic
daughter ofthe woman with whom he
lived.
During the voir dire process, the
defense counsel requested a racially
specific voir dire question. Instead of
Hernandez's proposed voir dire
question, the court stated to
prospective jurors that "they should
be as free as humanly possible from
prejudice,
sympathy,
and

preconceived ideas for or against
either party." The court refused to
racially particularize the question, even
after the prosecution urged it to do
so.
After . his
conviction,
Hernandez's motion for a new trial
was denied. Hernandez appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. The court of special
appeals affirmed the lower court's
ruling. Hernandez sought a writ of
certiorari, which was granted by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by considering the
development of federal law on voir
dire pertaining to racial prejudices.
Hernandez v. State, 357 Md. 204,
742 A.2d 952 (1999). The court
found that in the early stages of
addressing this issue, the United States
Supreme Court regarded racially
specific voir dire questions as being
essential to the adherence of our
criminaljustice system's notions of
fairness andjustice. Hernandez, 357
Md. at211, 742 A.2dat955 (citing
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S.
308,310 (1931». In Aldridge, the
Court reversed a lower court's
criminal conviction of an AfricanAmerican man based upon the lower
court's refusal of the defendant's
request for a voir dire question
regarding race. !d. at 210, 742 A.2d
at 955. In its holding, the United

States Supreme Court noted that the
"essential demands of fairness
required the trial court to propound
the requested questions in light of the
non-remote possibility of
disqualifying prejudice in the individual
members ofthe jury." Id.at211, 742
A.2d at 955 (quoting Aldridge, 283
U.S. at 310).
In examining later decisions of
the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland found that the
Court abandoned its earlier liberal
application ofracially specific voir
dire questions. Id.at211, 742A.2d
at 955. In Ristaino v. Ross, 424 US.
589 (1976), the Supreme Court
upheld the conviction of an AfricanAmerican defendant for assault and
battery and armed robbery of a
Caucasian security guard, even after
the trial court's refusal ofdefendant's
voir dire request. In its holding, the
Ristaino Court concluded that
racially specific voir dire.questions
are only appropriate in circumstances
in which there is a "constitutionally
significant likelihood that, absent
questioning about racial prejudice,
the jurors would not be as indifferent
as they stand unsworne." Id. at 219,
742 A.2d at 956 (quoting Ristaino,
424 US. at 598). In analyzing the
Supreme Court's reasoning for
requiring the "special circumstances"
standard, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland concluded that the Court
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must view racial prejudice as a "latent
attitude that becomes effective only
under particular, racially charged
circumstances." Id. at213, 742 A.2d
at 956.
The court of appeals further
examined Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, where a plurality of the Court
added another dimension to the
"special circumstances" standard. Id.
at 213, 742 A.2d at 957 (citing
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451
U.S. 182 (1981)). In that case, the
Court noted that only in cases that
dealt with violent interracial crime
would there exist circumstances that
would warrant racially specific voir
dire questioning. Id. at 214, 742 A.2d
at 957. The Rosales-Lopez court
reasoned that in the absence ofthis
standard, there would be an
impression that 'justice in a court of
law may turn upon the pigmentation
of skin (or) the accident of birth. " Id.
(quoting Rosales, 451 U.S. at 190,
(quoting Ristaino, 424 US. at 596)).
Therefore, under current federal law,
a trial court's refusal to propound
racially specific voir dire questions in
the absence of racially charged
circumstances does not constitute
reversible error.
In examining Maryland law on
this issue, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland found that in its most recent
decision, they rejected the narrow
federal position. Id. at214, 742 A.2d
at 957 (citing to Hill v. State, 339
Md. 275, 661 A.2d 1164 (1995)).
The court of appeals rejected prior
federal precedent based upon the
U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in
Ristaino: "the States are free to allow
or require voir dire questions not
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demanded by the US. Constitution."
Id. at2I8, 742 A.2d at 959 (quoting
Ristaino, 424 US. at 594).
In Hill, the court of appeals
embraced the Aldridge decision, thus
characterizing a trial court's failure to
propound requested voir dire
questions as reversible error, even in
the absence of a showing of potential
juror bias. Id. at 219,742 A.2d at
960. The court further reasoned that
allowing per se racial voir dire
questions would strengthen the
criminal justice system by: (a)
acknowledging that racial prejudice is
a reality; (b) creating an impression
that racial prejudice will not be
tolerated; and (c) alleviating the need
for trial judges to search the record
for facts amounting to "special
circumstances." Id. at221, 742 A.2d
at 960-61.
In finding Hill controlling, the
court ofappeals ruled that Hernandez
was entitled to a racially specific voir
dire question. Id. at 223,742 A.2d
at 962. In so holding, the court
explained that its decision applies to
any defendant who requests race
specific voir dire questions, regardless
of their own race. Id. at 225, 742
A.2d at 963. The court further noted
that when a trial court is faced with a
defendant who has improperly
requested voir dire questions, it is
incumbent upon the court to submit a
question related to race on its own
motion. Id. at 224,742 A.2d at 962.
In light of the trial court's refusal to
propound racially specific voir dire
questions, as specifically requested by
the defendant,. the Court of Appeals
of Maryland ordered a new trial. Id.
at231,742A.2dat967.

The Court of Appeals of
Maryland's ruling reflects the effect of
potential racial prejUdice upon an
accused's right to a fair trial as a
primary, rather than secondary,
concern of the courts. In light of this
decision, Maryland practitioners need
to be aware that, other than a simple
request, there does not exist any
prerequisite to receiving racially
specific voir dire questions for their
clients. Although per se racially
specific voir dire questions will not
eliminate the racial prejudices that
inherently exist in our system, the court
of appeals's approach will help to
combat these prejUdices.

